A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f -optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin's definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the condition of weak set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin's monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that important social choice correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
This paper studies the problem of implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium. According to our definition, a mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if the set of all (pure and mixed) equilibrium outcomes corresponds to the set of f -optimal alternatives at each preference profile. Crucially, and unlike the classical definition of implementation, this definition of implementation does not give a predominant role to pure equilibria: an f -optimal alternative does not have to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. This sharply contrasts with most of the existing literature on Nash implementation, which does not consider equilibria in mixed strategies. Two notable exceptions are Maskin (1999) for Nash implementation and Serrano and Vohra (2009) for Bayesian implementation. These authors do consider mixed equilibria, but still require each f -optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. Pure equilibria are yet again given a special status.
Perhaps, the emphasis on pure equilibria expresses a discomfort with the classical view of mixing as deliberate randomizations on the part of players. However, it is now accepted that even if players do not randomize but choose definite actions, a mixed strategy may be viewed as a representation of the other players' uncertainty about a player's choice (e.g., see Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) . Moreover, almost all mixed equilibria can be viewed as pure Bayesian equilibria of nearby games of incomplete information, in which players are uncertain about the exact profile of preferences, as first suggested in the seminal work of Harsanyi (1973) . This view acknowledges that games with commonly known preferences are an idealization, a limit of near-complete information games. This interpretation is particularly important for the theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, whereby the assumption of common knowledge of preferences, especially on large domains, is at best a simplifying assumption.
1 Furthermore, recent evidence in the 1 The point that the assumption of common knowledge of preferences might be problematic is not new. For instance, Chung and Ely (2003) study the problem of full implementation of social choice functions under "near-complete information" and show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for implementation in undominated (pure) Nash equilibria. Their result sharply contrasts with Palfrey and Srivastava (1991), who have shown that almost all social choice functions are implementable in undominated (pure) Nash equilibria. Oury and Tercieux (2009) consider the problem of partial implementation of social choice functions under "almost complete" information and show that Maskin monotonicity is necessary for implementation in pure Nash equilibrium.
experimental literature suggests that equilibria in mixed strategies are good predictors of behavior in some classes of games e.g., coordination games and chicken games (see chapters 3 and 7 of Camerer, 2003) . Since, for some preference profiles, a mechanism can induce one of those games, paying attention to mixed equilibria is important if we want to describe or predict players' behavior. In sum, we believe that there are no compelling reasons to give pure Nash equilibria a special status and modify the definition of implementation accordingly.
It is important to stress that while we consider mixed strategies, we maintain an entirely ordinal approach. To be specific, we assume that a social choice correspondence f maps profiles of preference orderings over alternatives into subsets of alternatives (not lotteries) and we require that a given mechanism implements f irrespective of which cardinal representation of players' preferences is chosen.
Our definition of mixed Nash implementation yields novel insights. We demonstrate that the condition of Maskin monotonicity is not necessary for full implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, consider a profile of preferences and an alternative, say a, that is f -optimal at that profile of preferences. According to Maskin's definition of implementation, there must exist a pure Nash equilibrium with equilibrium outcome a. Thus, any alternative a player can trigger by unilateral deviations must be less preferred than a. Now, if we move to another profile of preferences where a does not fall down in the players' ranking, then a remains an equilibrium outcome and must be f -optimal at that new profile of preferences. This is the intuition behind the necessary condition of Maskin monotonicity for full implementation. Unlike Maskin's definition of implementation, our definition does not require a to be a pure equilibrium outcome. So, suppose that there exists a mixed equilibrium with a as an equilibrium outcome. 2 The key observation to make is that the mixed equilibrium induces a lottery over optimal alternatives. Thus, when we move to another profile of preferences where a does not fall down in the players' ranking, the original profile of strategies does not have to be an equilibrium at the new state. In fact, we show that a much weaker condition, weak set-monotonicity, is necessary for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium. Weak set-monotonicity states that the set f (θ) of optimal alternatives at state θ is included in the set f (θ ′ ) of optimal alternatives at state θ ′ , whenever the weak and strict lower contour sets at state θ of all alternatives in f (θ) are included in their respective weak and strict lower contour sets at state θ ′ , for all players.
To substantiate our claim that weak set-monotonicity is a substantially weaker requirement than Maskin monotonicity, we show that the strong Pareto and the strong core correspondences are weak set-monotonic on the unrestricted domain of preferences, while they are not Maskin monotonic. Similarly, on the domain of strict preferences, the top-cycle correspondence is weak set-monotonic, but not Maskin monotonic.
Furthermore, we show that weak set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient for implementation on the domain of strict preferences. However, and somewhat surprisingly, the condition of weak set-monotonicity even coupled with the no-veto power condition is not sufficient for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium in general. A mild strengthening of weak set-monotonicity that we call weak* set-monotonicity is required.
We also provide an additional condition, called top-D-inclusiveness, which together with weak* set-monotonicity, guarantees the implementation by finite mechanisms in separable environments. Lastly, since no-veto power is not satisfied by important social choice correspondences like the strong Pareto and the strong core, we also present sufficient conditions that dispense with the no-veto power condition. (See Benoît and Ok, 2008, and Bochet, 2007.) An important feature of our sufficiency proofs is the use of randomized mechanisms.
This is a natural assumption given that players can use mixed strategies. Indeed, although a randomized mechanism introduces some uncertainty about the alternative to be chosen, the concept of a mixed Nash equilibrium already encapsulates the idea that players are uncertain about the messages sent to the designer and, consequently, about the alternative to be chosen. We also stress that the randomization can only be among optimal alternatives in equilibrium. In the literature on (exact) Nash implementation, randomized mechanisms have been studied by Benoît and Ok (2008) and Bochet (2007) .
These authors restrict attention to mechanisms in which randomization by the designer can only occur out of equilibrium, and do not attempt to rule out mixed strategy equilibria with undesirable outcomes. On the contrary, we allow randomization among f -optimal alternatives at equilibrium and rule out mixed equilibria with outcomes that are not f -optimal. Our approach also differs from the use of randomized mechanisms in the literature on virtual implementation (e.g., see Matsushima, 1998 , and Abreu and Sen, 1991), which heavily exploits the possibility of selecting undesirable alternatives with positive probability in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example illustrating our ideas. Section 3 contains preliminaries and introduces the definition of mixed Nash implementation. Section 4 presents the necessary condition of weak set-monotonicity, while sections 5, 6 and 7 provides several sets of sufficient conditions. Section 8 applies our results to some well known social choice correspondences and section 9 concludes.
A Simple Example
This section illustrates our notion of mixed Nash implementation with the help of a simple example. The designer aims to implement the social choice correspondence f , with f (θ) = {a} and f (θ ′ ) = {a, b, c, d}. We say that alternative x is f -optimal at state θ if x ∈ f (θ).
We first argue that the social choice correspondence f is not implementable in the sense of Maskin (1999). Maskin's definition of Nash implementation requires that for each f -optimal alternative at a given state, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium (of the game induced by the mechanism) corresponding to that alternative. So, for instance, at state θ ′ , there must exist a pure Nash equilibrium with b as equilibrium outcome.
Maskin requires, furthermore, that no such equilibrium must exist at state θ. However, if there exists a pure equilibrium with b as equilibrium outcome at state θ ′ , then b will also be an equilibrium outcome at state θ, since b moves up in every players' ranking when going from state θ ′ to state θ. Thus, the correspondence f is not implementable in the sense of Maskin. In other words, the social choice correspondence f violates Maskin monotonicity, a necessary condition for implementation in the sense of Maskin.
In contrast with Maskin, we do not require that for each f -optimal alternative at a given state, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium corresponding to that alternative.
We require instead that the set of f -optimal alternatives coincides with the set of mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes. So, at state θ ′ , there must exist a mixed Nash equilibrium with b corresponding to an action profile in the support of the equilibrium.
We now argue that with our definition of implementation, the correspondence f is there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium that puts strictly positive probability on each action profile (since preferences are strict), hence on each outcome. 3 Therefore, f is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium, although it is not implementable in the sense of Maskin.
We conclude this section with two important observations. First, our notion of implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium is ordinal : the social choice correspondence f is implementable regardless of the cardinal representation chosen for the two players. Second, alternative d is f -optimal at state θ ′ , and it moves down in player 1's ranking when moving from θ ′ to θ. This preference reversal guarantees the weak set-monotonicity of the correspondence f , which, as we shall see, is a necessary condition for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium.
where g(m i , m −i )(x) is the probability that x is chosen by the mechanism when the profile of messages (m i , m −i ) is announced. The induced strategic-form game is thus
, θ)) i∈N . Let σ be a profile of mixed strategies. We denote with P σ,g the probability distribution over alternatives in X induced by the allocation rule g and the profile of mixed strategies σ.
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Definition 1 The mechanism (M i ) i∈N , g implements the social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if for all θ ∈ Θ, for all cardinal representations u(·, θ) ∈ U θ of θ , the following two conditions hold:
, there exists a Nash equilibrium σ * of G(θ, u) such that x is in the support of P σ * ,g , and
Before proceeding, it is important to contrast our definition of implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium with Maskin (1999) definition of Nash implementation.
First, part (i) of Maskin's definition requires that for each x ∈ f (θ), there exists a pure Nash equilibrium m * of G(θ, u) with equilibrium outcome x, while part (ii) of his definition is identical to ours. In contrast with Maskin, we allow for mixed strategy Nash equilibria in part (i) and, thus, restore a natural symmetry between parts (i) and
(ii). Yet, our definition respects the spirit of full implementation in that only optimal outcomes can be observed by the designer as equilibrium outcomes.
Second, as in Maskin, our concept of implementation is ordinal as all equilibrium outcomes have to be optimal, regardless of the cardinal representation chosen. Also, our approach parallels the approach of Gibbard (1977) . Gibbard considers probabilistic social choice functions, i.e., mapping from profiles of preferences to lotteries over outcomes, and characterizes the set of strategy-proof probabilistic social choice functions.
Importantly to us, Gibbard requires each player to have an incentive to truthfully reveal his preference, regardless of the cardinal representation chosen to evaluate lotteries (and announcements of others).
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4 Formally, the probability Third, we allow the designer to use randomized mechanisms. This is a natural assumption given that players can use mixed strategies. Indeed, although a randomized mechanism introduces some uncertainty about the alternative to be chosen, the concept of a mixed Nash equilibrium already encapsulates the idea that players are uncertain about the messages sent to the designer and, consequently, about the alternative to be chosen. We also stress that the randomization can only be among optimal alternatives in equilibrium. In the context of (exact) Nash implementation, Benoît and Ok (2008) and Bochet (2007) have already considered randomized mechanisms. 6 There are two important differences with our work, however. First, these authors restrict attention to mechanisms in which randomization only occurs out of equilibrium, while randomization can occur in equilibrium in our work, albeit only among optimal alternatives. Second, unlike us, they do not attempt to rule out mixed strategy equilibria with undesirable outcomes. Also, our work contrasts with the literature on virtual implementation (e.g., Matsushima, 1998) . In that literature, randomization can also occur in equilibrium. Moreover, even non-optimal alternatives can occur with positive probability in equilibrium. Unlike this literature, we focus on exact implementation:
only f -optimal alternatives can be equilibrium outcomes.
Finally, from our definition of mixed Nash implementation, it is immediate to see that if a social choice correspondence is Nash implementable (i.e.,à la Maskin), then it is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium. The converse is false, as shown by Example 1 in Section 2. The goal of this paper is to characterize the social choice correspondences implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium. The next section provides a necessary condition.
A Necessary Condition
This section introduces a new condition, called weak set-monotonicity, which we show to be necessary for the implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 A social choice correspondence f is weak set-monotonic if for all pairs
Weak set-monotonicity is a weakening of Maskin monotonicity. It requires that if for all players, the lower and strict lower contour sets of all alternatives in f (θ) do not shrink in moving from θ to θ ′ , then the set f (θ ′ ) of optimal alternatives at θ ′ must be a superset of the set f (θ) of optimal alternatives at θ. As we shall see in Section 8, important correspondences, like the strong Pareto correspondence, the strong core correspondence and the top-cycle correspondence are weak-set monotonic, while they fail to be Maskin monotonic.
Theorem 1 If the social choice correspondence f is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium, then it satisfies the weak set-monotonicity condition.
Proof The proof is by contradiction on the contrapositive. Assume that the social choice correspondence f does not satisfy weak set-monotonicity and yet is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium by the mechanism M, g .
Since f does not satisfy weak set-monotonicity, there exist x * , θ, and θ ′ such that 
It follows that
Let us now consider the cardinal representations constructed in the claim above;
Since f is implementable, we have that the support of P σ * ,g is included in f (θ). Therefore,
Hence, the lefthand side of the inequality (1) is zero. Furthermore, we have that
Hence, the right-hand side of (1) is non-negative, a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Several remarks are worth making. First, Theorem 1 remains valid if we restrict ourself to deterministic mechanisms, so that weak-set monotonicity is a necessary condition for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, regardless of whether we consider deterministic or randomized mechanisms. Second, it is easy to verify that weak-set monotonicity is also a necessary condition for implementation if we require the Nash equilibria to be in pure strategies, but allow randomized mechanisms. Third, while
we have restricted attention to von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, the condition of weak set-monotonicity remains necessary if we consider larger classes of preferences that include the von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. This is because we follow an ordinal approach and require that f be implemented by all admissible preference representations.
As customary in the large literature on implementation (see Jackson, 2001 , and
Maskin and Sjöström, 2002, for excellent surveys), it is natural to ask whether the condition of weak set-monotonicity is "almost" sufficient for implementation. The following example shows that this is not the case. The social choice correspondence is f (θ) = {a} and f (θ ′ ) = {b}. It is weak 
The intuition is clear.
Since players 1 and 3's preferences do not change from θ to θ ′ and a is top-ranked for player 2 at both states, any equilibrium at θ with outcome a remains an equilibrium at θ ′ (with the above cardinal representation). At state θ ′ , there is no alternative that can be used to generate a profitable deviation for player 2.
Note, furthermore, that the social choice correspondence f in Example 2 satisfies the no-veto power condition. Hence, no-veto power together with weak set-monotonicity are not sufficient for mixed Nash implementation. The next section provides sufficient conditions: a strengthening of weak-set monotonicity will be needed.
Sufficient Conditions
Before stating the main result of this section, we need to introduce two additional definitions. The first definition strengthens the notion of weak set-monotonicity.
Definition 3 A social choice correspondence f is weak* set-monotonic if for all pairs
Clearly, if a social choice correspondence is Maskin monotonic, then it is weak* setmonotonic, and if it is weak* set-monotonic, then it is weak set-monotonic. Moreover, weak* set-monotonicity coincides with weak set-monotonicity if max θ i X is a singleton for each i ∈ N, for each θ ∈ Θ. We refer to this domain of preferences as the single-top preferences. This mild domain restriction will prove useful in applications (see Section 8). Furthermore, on the domain of strict preferences (a subset of single-top preferences)
for all x and θ, and weak* set-monotonicity is equivalent to weak set-monotonicity.
Note that in Example 2, the social choice correspondence f is not weak* set-monotonic
, and yet a / ∈ f (θ ′ ). This explains the failure of f to be implementable, despite being weak set-monotonic and satisfying the condition of no-veto power.
The second condition we need is a natural restriction on the set of cardinal representations at each state, which guarantees that the set of admissible cardinal representations is closed. Example 5 below illustrates the difficulties arising when the set of cardinal representations is open. So, we assume that for each player i ∈ N, for each state θ ∈ Θ, the set of admissible cardinal representations is a compact subset U θ i of U θ i . It follows that there exists ε > 0 such that for all i ∈ N, for all θ, for all pairs (x, y) ∈ X × X with x ≻ θ i y, and for all
Accordingly, we have to modify Definition 1 of mixed Nash implementation so as to include this restriction on the set of cardinal representations. We call this weaker notion of implementation, mixed Nash C-implementation.
Naturally, with C-implementation, the condition of weak set-monotonicity might fail to be necessary as the following example shows. For instance, at state θ, player 1's utility of d is 2, while player 2's utility is 5. The social choice correspondence is f (θ) = {a} and f (θ ′ ) = {c}; it is not weak set-monotonic. Yet, it is easy to verify that f is implementable by the mechanism:
denotes a 50-50 lottery on x and y.
However, for "large" enough compact sets of cardinal representations, the condition of weak-set monotonicity remains necessary. For instance, fix δ > 0, and let U We are now ready to present the main result of this section, which states that in any environment with at least three players, weak* set-monotonicity and no veto-power are sufficient conditions for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Let N, X, Θ be an environment with n ≥ 3. If the social choice correspondence f is weak* set-monotonic and satisfies no-veto power, then it is C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Proof Consider the following mechanism M, g . For each player i ∈ N, the message
In words, each player announces a state of the world, a function from alternatives and pairs of states into alternatives, an alternative, and a strictly positive integer. A typical message m i for player i is
(Note that we denote any integer z in bold.) Let M := × i∈N M i with typical element m.
Let {f 1 (θ), . . . , f K θ (θ)} = f (θ) be the set of f -optimal alternatives at state θ ; note that K θ = |f (θ)|. Let 1 > ε > 0 be such that for all i ∈ N, for all θ ∈ Θ, for all pairs (x, y) ∈ X × X with x ≻ θ i y, and for all
∈ ∆(X) be the lottery that puts probability one on outcome x ∈ X. The allocation rule g is defined as follows:
e., all agents make the same announcement
is the "uniform" lottery 9 To see this, fix the following cardinal representation of 
That is all we need for the proof of Theorem 1 to go through.
over alternatives in f (θ); that is,
Rule 2: If there exists j ∈ N such that m i = (θ, α, x, 1) for all i ∈ N \ {j}, with
is the lottery:
for 1 > δ > 0, and
That is, suppose all players but player j send the same message (θ, α, x, 1) with α(f k (θ), θ, θ)
be the message sent by player j.
of f k (θ) at state θ, then the designer replaces the outcome f k (θ) from the uniform lottery with the lottery that attaches probability δ(1−ε) to x, probability δε to x j , and probabil-
(i.e., player j is indifferent between x and f k (θ) at state θ), then the designer replaces the outcome f k (θ) from the uniform lottery with the lottery that attaches probability δ to x and probability (1 − δ) to f k (θ). Otherwise, the designer does not replace the outcome f k (θ) from the uniform lottery.
Rule 3: If neither rule 1 nor rule 2 applies, then Step 1. We first show that for any x ∈ f (θ * ), there exists a Nash equilibrium σ * of G(θ * , u) such that x belongs to the support of P σ * ,g . Consider a profile of strategies σ * such that σ * i = (θ * , α, x, 1) for all i ∈ N, so that rule 1 applies. The (pure strategy) profile σ * is clearly a Nash equilibrium at state θ * . By deviating, each player i can trigger rule 2, but none of these possible deviations are profitable. Any deviation can either induce a probability shift in the uniform lottery from f k (θ * ) to a lottery with mass (1 − ε) on an alternative in SL i (f k (θ * ), θ * ) and mass ε on x j , or shift δ probability mass from f k (θ * ) to
By definition of ε, the former type of deviation is not profitable and the latter type of deviation is clearly not profitable. Moreover, under σ * , the support of P σ * ,g is f (θ * ).
Hence, for any x ∈ f (θ * ), there exists an equilibrium that implements x.
Step 2. Conversely, we need to show that if σ * is a mixed Nash equilibrium of G(θ * , u), then the support of P σ * ,g is included in f (θ * ). Let m be a message profile and denote with g O (m) the set of alternatives that occur with strictly positive probability when m is played: g O (m) = {x ∈ X : g(m)(x) > 0}. Let us partition the set of messages M into three subsets corresponding to the three allocation rules. First, let R 1 be the set of message profiles such that rule 1 applies, i.e., R 1 = {m : m j = (θ, α, x, 1) for all j ∈ N,
, then rule 2 applies and agent i is the only agent differentiating his message. Let R i 2 be the set of these message profiles and define R 2 = ∪ i∈N R i 2 . Third, let R 3 be the set of message profiles such that rule 3 applies (i.e., R 3 is the complement of R 1 ∪ R 2 in M).
Consider an equilibrium σ * of G(θ * , u) and let M * i be the set of message profiles that occur with positive probability under σ *
Step 3. For any player i ∈ N, for all m *
, where: 1) α D differs from α i in at most the alternatives associated with elements (f k (θ), θ, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K θ }; that is, we can only have 
and all k ∈ {1, . . . , K θ }, player i can guarantee himself an arbitrarily small, worst-case loss ofū, in the event that m * ∈ ∪ j =i R j 2 under σ * .
Step 5. Let us now suppose that there exists (m * i , m * −i ) ∈ R 1 ; that is, for all j = i, m * j = m * i = (θ, α, x, 1). In the event the message sent by all others is m * j = m * i , player i strictly gains from the deviation if
Since the expected gain in this event can be made greater thanū by appropriately choosing µ, (1) and (2) cannot hold for any player i. It follows that for σ * to be an equilibrium, for all i and all k, we must have (1)
and (2) either
Therefore, by the weak* set-monotonicity of f , we must have
Step 6. j X for all j = i. Therefore, by no-veto power, it must be
Step 7. It only remains to consider messages (m * i , m * −i ) ∈ R 3 . For such messages the argument is analogous to messages in R i 2 . For no player i to be able to profit from the deviation σ
Some remarks are in order. First, the mechanism constructed in the proof is inspired by the mechanism in the appendix of Maskin (1999) , but ours is a randomized mechanism. 10 As we have already explained, we believe this is natural given that we consider the problem of implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Second, our construction uses integer games. While we agree that integer games are not entirely satisfactory (e.g., see Jackson, 2001 ), Theorem 2 is no different from the large literature on implementation in having to resort to integer games in order to rule out unwanted (not f -optimal) outcomes. In section 6, we will provide sufficient conditions for mixed Nash implementation by finite mechanisms: mechanisms in which (unlike in an integer game) each player only has a finite number of strategies.
Third, Theorem 2 strongly relies on the condition of weak* set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin monotonicity, which is relatively easy to check in applications. We have not tried to look for necessary and sufficient conditions for mixed Nash implementation.
We suspect that such a characterization will involve conditions that are hard to check in practice, as it is the case for Nash implementationà la Maskin (e.g., condition µ of Moore and Repullo, 1990 , condition M of Sjöström, 1991, condition β of Dutta and Sen, or strong monotonicity of Danilov, 1992) . We do know, however, as example 4 below
shows, that weak* set-monotonicity is not necessary for Nash implementation.
Fourth, we have not attempted to find sufficient conditions for the case of two players.
Such a case requires a special treatment and is better left to another paper. The social choice correspondence is f (θ) = {a, b, c} and f (θ ′ ) = {b, c}. It is not weak* set-monotonic, but it is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium. To see that f is not weak* set-monotonic, note that a / ∈ f (θ ′ ) and yet:
To show that f is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium, consider the mechanism in which players 1 and 2 have two messages each, m 1 and m 2 , player 3 has no message, and the allocation rule is represented below (player 1 is the row player):
If the profile of preferences is θ ′ , (m 1 , m 2 ) is the unique pure Nash equilibrium of the game, with outcome c. There is also an equilibrium in which player 1 chooses m 1 and player 2 (appropriately) mixes over m 1 and m 2 . There is no equilibrium in which both players mix. (Note that m 2 is weakly dominant for player 2 at state θ ′ .) On the other hand, it is clear that if the profile of preferences is θ, then there is an equilibrium in which both players totally mix between m 1 and m 2 . Therefore, f is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium, although it is not weak* set-monotonic.
We now claim that the restriction to compact sets of cardinal representations in Theorem 2 can be relaxed if we strengthen the condition of weak* set-monotonicity to strong set-monotonicity. Theorem 3 formally states this result without proof. Definition 4 A social choice correspondence f is strong set-monotonic if for all pairs
Note that on the domain of strict preferences, strong set-monotonicity coincides with weak and weak* set-monotonicity. Moreover, if a social choice correspondence is Maskin monotonic, then it is strong set-monotonic, and if it is strong set-monotonic, then it is weak set-monotonic.
Theorem 3 Let N, X, Θ be an environment with n ≥ 3. If the social choice correspondence f is strong set-monotonic and satisfies no-veto power, then it is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Lastly, the next example shows that weak* set-monotonicity and no-veto power are not sufficient for mixed Nash implementation: either a restriction to compact set of cardinal representations is needed or the condition of weak* set-monotonicity needs to be strengthened to strong set-monotonicity. The social choice correspondence is f (θ) = {a} and f (θ ′ ) = {b}. It satisfies weak* setmonotonicity and no-veto power; hence it is C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Let η be any real number with η ≥ 2. Consider the following (non-compact) family of preference cardinalizations:
Note that there is a unique utility representation for player 1 and 3 and the representation for player 2 only varies in the utility assigned to alternative b in state θ. We will show that with such a set of cardinal representations, f cannot be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium. Suppose, to the contrary, that it can. Then, when θ is the true state, there is an equilibrium σ * with full support on outcome a.
Consider a possible deviation σ D 2 by player 2 and let p a , p b , p c , p d be the probability on each of the four outcomes induced by such a deviation. It must be the case that the deviation is not profitable when the state is θ; that is,
Since σ * cannot be an equilibrium when the true state is θ ′ (otherwise f would not be implemented) and the preferences of players 1 and 3 do not change with the state, there must be a deviation σ D 2 by player 2 that is profitable when the state is θ ′ and player 1 and 3 play σ * 1 and σ * 3 ; that is,
Equation (2) implies that for all
Finite Mechanisms
Theorem 2 relies on integer games to provide sufficient conditions for mixed Nash implementation. As pointed out by Jackson (2001, p. 684), this is not totally satisfactory: "A player's best response correspondence is not well-defined when that player faces a mixed strategy of the others that places weight on an infinite set of integers." In this section, we look at finite mechanisms; that is, for each player i ∈ N, we impose that the set of messages M i is finite. 12 Since this paper considers finite environments (finite sets of alternatives and preference profiles), the restriction to finite mechanisms is natural. We use two additional conditions. First, following Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava (1994),
we restrict attention to separable environments. An environment is separable if the following two properties hold:
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A1 A worst outcome relative to f : there exists w ∈ X such that x ≻ θ i w for all i ∈ N, all (θ, θ ′ ) ∈ Θ × Θ, and all x ∈ f (θ ′ ).
12 Best responses are well-defined in games induced by finite mechanisms. 13 The definition by Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava (1994) includes a third property, strict value distinction, which we do not need. Also, our property A2 is weaker then their corresponding property.
A2 Separability: For all x ∈ X, all θ ′ ∈ Θ, and i ∈ N, there exists
There are several examples of separable environments, e.g., pure exchange economies with strictly monotone preferences or environments with transferable utilities. We refer the reader to Jackson et al. (1994) for more examples.
14 Let D be a subset of N containing at least one player. The second condition we require is that for each player i in D and for each state of the world θ, f (θ) contains the top alternatives for player i in the range X f := f (Θ) of f . A formal definition is as follows.
Definition 5 A social choice correspondence f is top-D-inclusive (relative to f ) if there exists a non-empty subset D of the set of players N such that ∪ i∈D max
Top-D-inclusiveness is an efficiency condition. For instance, the weak Pareto correspondence is top-D-inclusive. Note also that if f is top-D-inclusive with D containing at least two elements and X f = X, then it satisfies no-veto power. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 4 Let N, X, Θ be a separable environment with n ≥ 3. If the social choice correspondence f is weak* set-monotonic and top-D-inclusive, then it is C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium by a finite mechanism.
The intuition for Theorem 4 is simple. Consider a profile of messages m * such that all but player i announces the same message (i.e., rule 2 of the proof of Theorem 2 applies: m * ∈ R i 2 ). An essential role of the integer game in Theorem 2 is to guarantee that any player j = i can trigger the integer game, gets his favorite alternative (with arbitrary high probability) and, thus, cannot be worse off. Without the integer game, this is not always possible. However, with separable environments, we can guarantee player i the same expected payoff under m * , while giving to all the other players the payoff corresponding to the worst outcome. In turn, this implies that any player j = i can trigger a finite "game" between players in D where only alternatives in X f can be implemented and, thus, not be worse off. Lastly, top-D-inclusiveness guarantees that the outcomes of the finite "game" are f -optimal. The formal proof of Theorem 4 is in the Appendix.
We end this section with three remarks. First, we do not know how tight our sufficient conditions for finite mechanisms are. Clearly, dictatorial and constant social choice correspondences are implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium by finite mechanisms in general environments. 15 Furthermore, in Example 1, we implement a social choice correspondence by a finite mechanism and yet it is neither top-D-inclusive nor dictatorial nor constant. 16 Second, as in Theorem 3, if we replace weak* set-monotonicity with strong set-monotonicity, then we obtain a sufficiency theorem for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium by a finite mechanism, as opposed to C-implementation. Third, it is worth emphasizing the difference between Theorem 4 and the results in three related papers. Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava (1994) and Sjöström (1994) use bounded mechanisms that make no use of integer games, but their solution concept is different from ours; they consider implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium, rather than Nash implementation. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) use finite mechanisms, but their results are for virtual implementation, and their mechanism requires, among other things, that agents transmit cardinal information about their preferences to the center. We focus on exact implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium and on ordinal mechanisms.
17

Dispensing with No-Veto Power
As pointed out by Benoît and Ok (2008) and Bochet (2007) , the appeal of the no-veto power condition may be questioned in settings with a small number of agents. In the 15 In separable environments, a constant social choice function is weak * set-monotonic and top-Dinclusive. Moreover, setting |D| = 1 and X f ⊆ ∪ θ∈Θ max θ i X allows to define weak * set-monotonic and top-D-inclusive social choice correspondences that are essentially dictatorial. 16 Example 1 is with two players, but it is easy to modify it so as to have three players: add a third player with the same preferences as player 1.
17 Almost any social choice correspondence is implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium (Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991) or virtually implementable in Nash equilibrium (Abreu and Sen, 1991) . But, as we pointed out in fn. 1, Chung and Ely (2003) show that if the assumption of complete information is relaxed to "near-complete information," then Maskin monotonicity is restored as a necessary condition for implementation in undominated, pure, Nash equilibrium.
context of pure Nash implementation, and allowing for out-of-equilibrium randomness in the mechanism, they showed that no-veto power can be dispensed with, provided that some mild domain restrictions are imposed. 18 We now show that similar results can be obtained in the context of mixed Nash implementation.
Definition 6 (Bochet, 2007) An environment N, X, Θ satisfies top-strict difference if for any θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ X such that x ∈ ∩ i∈I max
Top strict difference requires that if n − 1 agents rank x at the top, then at least two agents must rank x strictly at the top. we have x ∈ f (θ) whenever {x} = ∩ i∈N max θ i X.
As argued by Benoît and Ok (2008) , the top-coincidence condition is a fairly mild domain restriction, while weak unanimity is a much weaker condition than no-veto power. Clearly, if f satisfies no-veto power, then it is weakly unanimous, but the converse does not hold. We have the following theorem.
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Theorem 5 Let N, X, Θ be an environment with n ≥ 3. If the social choice correspondence f is weak* set-monotonic and either (a) the environment satisfies the top- 18 Bochet (2007) showed that, with n ≥ 3, Maskin monotonicity is sufficient for Nash implementation if preferences satisfy top-strict difference. Benoît and Ok (2008) , again with n ≥ 3, showed that Maskin monotonicity and weak unanimity of f are sufficient if preferences satisfy the top-coincidence condition.
Both papers use out-of-equilibrium randomness in the mechanism, but limit themselves to rule out unwanted pure equilibria. 19 The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
coincidence condition and f is weakly unanimous, or (b) the environment satisfies the top-strict-difference condition, then f is C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium. 20 
Applications
This section contains a series of remarks in which we provide applications of our results to some important social choice rules.
Remark 1 On the unrestricted domain of preferences, the strong Pareto correspondence f P O is weak set-monotonic, while it fails to be Maskin monotonic. Therefore, on the domain of single-top preferences, f P O satisfies weak* set-monotonicity and no veto power. 21 Hence, if we restrict attention to the domain of single-top preferences, Theorem 2 applies and f P O is C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
The strong Pareto correspondence is defined as follows:
and x ∈ SL i (y, θ) for at least one i ∈ N}.
To see that f P O is weak set-monotonic, consider two states θ and θ ′ such that for
Suppose that
. At state θ ′ , there must then exists y ∈ X such that y / ∈ SL i (x * , θ ′ ) for all i ∈ N and y / ∈ L i (x * , θ ′ ) for at least one i ∈ N. It follows that y / ∈ SL i (x * , θ) for all i ∈ N and y / ∈ L i (x * , θ) for at least one i ∈ N, a contradiction with
To see that the strong Pareto correspondence is not Maskin monotonic on the domain of single-top preferences (and, therefore, on the unrestricted domain), consider the following example. There are three players, 1, 2 and 3, and two states of the world θ 20 Theorem 5 is stated for weak* set-monotonic correspondences and C-implementation, but also holds for strong set-monotonic correspondences and mixed Nash implementation. Only a modification like the one needed to prove Theorem 3 is required. 21 Recall that on the domain of single-top preferences, max θ i X is a singleton for each i ∈ N , for each θ ∈ Θ, and thus weak* set-monotonicity coincides with weak set-monotonicity. The strong Pareto correspondence is:
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Remark 2 Using arguments that parallel the ones used for the strong Pareto correspondence, it can be verified that on the unrestricted domain of preferences the strong core correspondence f SC is weak set-monotonic. If we restrict attention to the domain of single-top preferences f SC also satisfies weak* monotonicity, while it is not Maskin monotonic on either domain of preferences. Since f SC also satisfies weak unanimity, by Theorem 5, it is C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium in the domain of single-top preferences.
A coalitional game is a quadruple N, X, θ, v , where N is the set of players, X is the finite set of alternatives, θ is a profile of preference relations, and v : 2
An alternative x is weakly blocked by the coalition S ⊆ N \ {∅} if there is a y ∈ v(S) such that x ∈ L i (y, θ) for all i ∈ S and x ∈ SL i (y, θ) for at least one i ∈ S. If there is an alternative that is not weakly blocked by any coalition in 2 N \ {∅}, then N, X, θ, v is a game with a non-empty strong core. A coalitional environment with non-empty strong core is a quadruple N, X, Θ, v , where Θ is a set of preference relations such that N, X, θ, v has a non-empty strong core for all θ ∈ Θ.
The strong core correspondence f SC is defined for all coalitional environments with non-empty strong core as follows:
x is not weakly blocked by any ∅ = S ⊆ N} . 22 On the unrestricted domain of preferences, f P O is not weak* set-monotonic. To see this, suppose alternative d is not available in the example. The strong Pareto correspondence is then f (θ) = {a, b}
. In fact, following the reasoning in Example 2, we can see that f P O is not C-implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium in this modified example.
Remark 3 On the unrestricted domain of preferences, a Maskin monotonic social choice
function -that is a correspondence f such that f (θ) is a singleton for all θ -must be constant (Saijo, 1988 ). This needs not be the case for a weak set-monotonic social choice function. To see this, define a partition {Θ 1 , . . . , Θ K } of Θ with Θ 1 := {θ ∈ Θ :
X} for all k > 1 and let f (θ) = x k for all θ ∈ Θ k , for all k. The social choice function f is a selection of player i's dictatorial social choice correspondence and is not constant. Yet, it is weak set-monotonic.
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Remark 4 On the domain of strict preferences, the top-cycle correspondence, an important voting rule, is weak* (and hence weak) set-monotonic, while it is not Maskin monotonic. Since it also satisfies no-veto power, it follows that Theorem 3 applies: on the domain of strict preferences, the top-cycle correspondence is implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
We say that alternative x defeats alternative y at state θ, written x ≫ θ y, if the number of players who prefer x to y is strictly greater than the number of players who prefer y to x. At each state θ, the top-cycle correspondence selects the smallest subset of X such that any alternative in it defeats all alternatives outside it.
To prove that the top-cycle correspondence is weak set-monotonic, assume to the contrary that there is at least an alternative x * such that x * ∈ f T C (θ), x * / ∈ f T C (θ ′ ), and
for all x ∈ f T C (θ), for all i ∈ N. (When preferences are strict L i (x, θ)\ {x} = SL i (x, θ) and strong set-monotonicity coincides with weak set-monotonicity and weak* set-monotonicity.) Clearly, if x * is a Condorcet winner at θ so that f T C (θ) = {x * }, then x * is also a Condorcet winner at θ ′ ; hence x * ∈ f T C (θ ′ ), a contradiction. Assume that x * is not a Condorcet winner; that is, the set f T C (θ) is not a singleton. Take any 23 To get some intuition, consider two states θ and θ ′ such that for all players but player i, preferences are the same at θ and θ ′ , player i's preferences differ only between x 2 and x 1 : x 2 ∈ max imply that x 2 ∈ f (θ ′ ); hence f is not Maskin monotonic. However, weak set-monotonicity does not imply that x 2 ∈ f (θ ′ ) since the strict lower contour sets of player i are not nested; f does not violate weak-set monotonicity.
alternative x ∈ f T C (θ) and any y / ∈ f T C (θ). By definition of f T C , it must be that
for all x ∈ f T C (θ), it must also be that x ≫ θ ′ y.
Hence, it must be f T C (θ ′ ) ⊆ f T C (θ). For all x * ∈ f T C (θ) \ f T C (θ ′ ) , it must be the case that x ≫ θ ′ x * for all x ∈ f T C (θ ′ ). Furthermore, since the lower contour sets of x * satisfy L i (x * , θ) ⊆ L i (x * , θ ′ ), the strict upper contour set of x * at θ ′ is a subset of the strict upper contour set at θ for all i ∈ N, and hence it must be x ≫ θ x * for all x ∈ f T C (θ ′ ) .
This contradicts the assumption that x * ∈ f T C (θ) and f T C (θ) is the smallest subset of X such that any alternative in it defeats all alternatives outside it at θ.
To see that f T C is not Maskin monotonic, consider the following example with two states, three alternatives and three players. We have that f T C (θ) = {a, b, c} and f T C (θ ′ ) = {c}. Since L i (a, θ) ⊆ L i (a, θ ′ ) for all i ∈ N, Maskin monotonicity and f T C (θ) = {a, b, c} would require a ∈ f T C (θ ′ ).
Remark 5
The Borda and the Kramer voting rules fail to satisfy weak set-monotonicity.
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It is simple to see that the example in Maskin (1999, page 30) shows that the Borda rule fails to satisfy not only Maskin monotonicity, but also weak set-monotonicity. For the Kramer rule, consider the example in the table below with five players, three alternatives and two states θ and θ ′ . The Kramer rule selects a at state θ and b at state θ ′ , a violation of weak set-monotonicity.
So, our results are not so permissive so as to imply that all "reasonable" social choice correspondences are implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce the concept of mixed Nash implementation. According to our definition, a mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes corresponds to the set of f -optimal alternatives at each preference profile. Crucially, and unlike Maskin, our definition does not give a predominant role to pure equilibria. While we allow players and the planner to randomize, we maintain an entirely ordinal approach. In our model, a social choice correspondence f maps profiles of preference orderings over alternatives into subsets of alternatives and we require that the chosen game form implements f for all possible cardinal representation of players' preferences. Also, we require exact, as opposed to virtual, implementation.
We show that weak set-monotonicity, a substantial weakening of Maskin's monotonicity, is necessary for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium. A mild strengthening of weak set-monotonicity, weak* set-monotonicity, plus no veto power are sufficient if there are at least three player. We also provide sufficient conditions which include weak* set-monotonicity and mild domain restrictions but do not include no-veto power. Restricting attention to finite mechanisms, we show that an efficiency condition, called top-D-inclusiveness, together with weak* set-monotonicity, is sufficient for implementation in separable environments. Important social choice correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic, like the strong Pareto, the strong core and the top-cycle may be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Fix a state θ * , and a cardinal representation u i ∈ U
